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THE CHILD JUSTICE ACT: A DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF SECTION 68 AS 
A POINT OF DEPARTURE WITH RESPECT TO THE SENTENCING OF YOUNG 
OFFENDERS 
 
SS Terblanche 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Sentences for young offenders1 have for many decades been at least somewhat 
more lenient than those for adults.2 When called upon to specifically address the 
issue, our courts have often acknowledged that young offenders should be afforded 
special treatment.3 Whatever the actual practice, the sentencing principles for child 
offenders changed fundamentally when the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 was adopted.4  This change was necessitated by section 28 of the 
Constitution, which introduced a set of rights specifically aimed at the protection of 
children.5 Some of these rights directly affect children "in conflict with the law", as 
                                                     
  Stephan Terblanche. BIur (PU for CHE), LLD (Unisa). Professor, Department of Criminal and 
Procedural Law, University of South Africa. Email: terblss@unisa.ac.za. Unisa provided funding 
for research visits, the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg, 
Germany made available its research facilities and Professor Louise Jordaan had valuable 
comments on an earlier draft. I want to express my gratitude to them all. 
1  In the past a few different categories of young offenders were specifically addressed in our law. 
For example, s 290 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (before its repeal by the Child 
Justice Act 75 of 2008) had specific provisions for "young offenders" under the age of 18 years, 
some of which were also available to offenders under 21 years of age; s 1 of the Correctional 
Services Act 8 of 1959 (repealed by the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998) defined a 
"juvenile" as someone under the age of 21 years of age. See eg Rabie, Strauss and Maré 
Punishment 205-206; Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (1999) 375, 384-394. 
2  See S v B 2006 1 SACR 311 (SCA) para 14: "The recognition that children accused of 
committing offences should be treated differently to adults is now over a century old"; DPP, 
KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 1 SACR 243 (SCA) para 12 (youth has always been a mitigating factor). 
Some of the earlier judgments include R v Smith 1922 TPD 199; S v Yibe 1964 3 SA 502 (E); S v 
Mohlobane 1969 1 SA 561 (A); S v Solani 1987 4 SA 203 (NC); S v Jansen 1975 1 SA 425 (A); 
S v Ngoma 1984 3 SA 666 (A). 
3  In addition to the cases in the previous footnote, see also S v Adams 1971 4 SA 125 (C) 126; S v 
Lehnberg 1975 4 SA 553 (A) 561. See also Terblanche 2007 SACJ 246. 
4  The change was initiated with the promulgation of the first Bill of Rights in the interim Constitution 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993): see Sloth-Nielsen 1996 Int'l J 
Children's Rts 325 (the first inclusion of the best-interests principle); Keightley "Children and the 
Legal System" 1-2; Van der Vyver 2006 Emory Int'l L Rev 10; S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 
(CC), esp. paras 69 (noting "growing interest in moves to develop a new juvenile justice 
system"), 74-75 (the state should provide an effective juvenile justice system; and "new creative 
methods to deal with the problem of juvenile justice" are required). 
5  The inclusion of children's rights in the Bill of Rights is widely viewed as one of the better 
examples of why the Constitution is held in such high regard internationally: see further, eg, 
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child accused or offenders are often referred to.6 In relation to sentencing, important 
rights include that the best interests of the child are paramount,7 and that children 
should not be imprisoned unless such imprisonment is unavoidable.8  
 
The rights in section 28 were at least in part informed by international agreements 
with respect to children. 9  The most important of these is the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereafter referred to as "the Convention").10 
South Africa had already signed and ratified this agreement when the Constitution 
came into effect, but the country had not yet complied with everything the 
Convention required of its signatories.11 The government then requested the South 
African Law Commission to investigate child justice in South Africa.12 Less than a 
decade later, this investigation culminated in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 
(hereafter referred to as "the Act").13 The Act establishes a criminal justice system for 
child accused, separate from the criminal justice system, which continues to apply 
for adult accused.14 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Grupp Südafrikas neue Verfassung 78-79; Van der Vyver 2006 Emory Int'l L Rev 11, 40 
(referring to the complete legislative package, including s 28 of the Constitution). 
6  See the Preamble to the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008; Gallinetti "Child Justice" 649; Inter-
Ministerial Committee Interim Recommendations 35. An alternative phraseology is children "in 
trouble with the law" (see Sloth-Nielsen 1996 SACJ 61; Sloth-Nielsen 1996 Int'l J Children's Rts 
344). 
7  Section 28(2) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
8  Section 28(1)(g) of the Constitution. 
9  S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 16. 
10  United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (the Convention), adopted by the 
General Assembly of the UN in 1989 and ratified by South Africa on 16 June 1995. 
11  See, in this connection, Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 417-420. 
12  See SA Law Commission Discussion Paper para 1.2. For more on the development of child 
justice until this point, including the essential role of Nelson Mandela, see Maguire 2012 New 
Crim L Rev 84-91. 
13  The Act (Child Justice Act 75 of 2008) was promulgated on 11 May 2009 (GN 549 in GG 32225 
of 11 May 2009) and came into operation on 1 April 2010: s 100. (Although s 100 allowed the 
President to put the Act into operation at an earlier date, this did not happen). The birth of the Act 
was a drawn-out process that has been particularly well-documented: see, eg, Badenhorst 
Implementation of the Child Justice Act 1-3 (a brief overview); Ehlers Child Justice 1-31 (more 
detail, especially on the Law Commission's work and the Parliamentary process); Skelton 
Restorative Justice and Child Justice 375-425; Gallinetti 2006 SA Crime Quarterly 7-12; Skelton 
and Gallinetti 2008 SA Crime Quarterly 3-9; Gallinetti "Child Justice" 643-648; Sloth-Nielsen and 
Gallinetti 2011 PELJ 63, 80-81; Maguire 2012 New Crim L Rev 91 et seq. 
14  The Preamble specifically refers to "…this new criminal justice system for children…" See also 
Gallinetti "Child Justice" 648; Le Roux-Kemp 2008 Annual Survey of South African Law 298 (the 
Act contains a "separate, but parallel, criminal justice system for children"); Maguire 2012 New 
Crim L Rev 72 (intended as a dramatic reform of the child justice system).  
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The Act aims to keep children out of detention and away from the formal criminal 
justice system, mainly through diversion. 15  When these interventions would be 
inadequate or unsuccessful, the Act provides for child offenders to be tried and 
sentenced in child justice courts. Until now there has been little discussion of the 
details of the provisions dealing with sentencing.16 
 
Sentencing in a child justice court is regulated by chapter 10 of the Act and section 
68 is the first section in this chapter. It reads as follows: 
 
A child justice court must, after convicting a child, impose a sentence in accordance 
with this Chapter. 
 
This section effectively amounts to the "jurisdictional" provision of the new child 
sentencing system. It not only mandates child justice courts to impose their 
sentences in terms of the Act, but also provides the first set of boundaries (or the first 
part of the framework) within which sentencing should take place.  
 
Despite its brevity section 68 is not without interpretative challenges. Of course, it 
has to be interpreted within the context of the whole Act.17 Explaining this context is 
the first function of this article. The various aspects of section 68 are then evaluated. 
The greatest challenges lie in the meanings of the words "child justice court" and 
"child", as well as the precise extent of the punitive jurisdiction of the courts.  
 
  
                                                     
15  See 2.5 below.  
16  See Gallinetti "Child Justice" 659-663 and Gallinetti Getting to Know the Child Justice Act 53-57 
for the most extensive discussions so far. Updated works on criminal procedure contain brief 
discussions, with Du Toit et al Commentary 28-29 stating that the Act "will in future be 
commented upon as case law and literature pertaining to Chapter 10 [the chapter dealing with 
sentencing] become available". See also Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 28-60 to 28-63, 
and Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 339-342. 
17  See Jaga v Dönges 1950 4 SA 653 (A) 662 for an authoritative statement of this general principle 
of statutory interpretation. This judgment is frequently quoted by the Constitutional Court. See eg 
Bertie Van Zyl v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 2 SA 181 (CC) para 21; Du Toit v Minister 
for Safety and Security 2009 6 SA 128 (CC) para 37; South African Police Service v Public 
Servants Association 2007 3 SA 521 (CC) para 17. See also, eg, Picardi Hotels v Thekwini 
Properties 2009 1 SA 493 (SCA) para 5; Du Plessis "Interpretation" 287-288. 
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2 Interpreting the Act  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Act itself contains a number of useful interpretive tools. The Preamble is 
particularly important. The current trend18 amongst our courts (and the Constitutional 
Court in particular) is to use preambles to legislation quite extensively in the process 
of interpreting that legislation.19 A preamble is considered a valuable summary of 
what the legislation aims to achieve,20 and the lengthy Preamble to the Act is a good 
example of this approach. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act are also useful tools: section 2 
reflects the objects of the Act and section 3 contains guiding principles to be applied 
in relation to the Act. These sections reinforce some of the general considerations 
set out in the Preamble. The specific considerations, which may assist in interpreting 
section 68, are considered below.  
 
2.2 Tools in the Act itself 
 
The Preamble prominently recognises the constitutional emphasis on the best 
interests of children and their need for special protection.21 In the case of children "in 
                                                     
18  Before the constitutional era it was not common for legislation to include a preamble (see further 
Steyn and Van Tonder Uitleg van Wette 145-146). When it did, the preamble would be 
considered only when the legislation itself was unclear or ambiguous – see Law Union and Rock 
Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael's Executor 1917 AD 593 597; Green v Minister of the Interior 
1968 4 SA 321 (A) 327; S v Kola 1966 4 SA 322 (A) 326G-H; S v Heita 1987 1 SA 311 (SWA) 
319J-320B; S v Davidson 1988 3 SA 252 (ZS) 254E-J; and even as recently as in Geyser v 
Msunduzi Municipality 2003 5 SA 18 (N). In NDPP v Seevnarayan 2003 2 SA 178 (C) para 58 
such an approach was described as "antiquated". 
19  See S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC) para 112 (Sachs J stated: "The preamble in particular 
should not be dismissed as a mere aspirational and throat-clearing exercise of little interpretive 
value. It connects up, reinforces and underlies all of the text that follows. It helps to establish the 
basic design of the Constitution and indicate its fundamental purposes"). Also City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 
24, 36; S v Acting Regional Magistrate, Boksburg 2011 2 SACR 274 (CC) para 21 (with respect 
to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007); 
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) paras 170-171 
(containing substantial reference to the Preamble to the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act 12 of 2004); Du Plessis "Interpretation" 391. See also Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti 
2011 PELJ 66-67 (the Preamble to the Child Justice Act is "not insignificant and … can play a 
role in the future interpretation" of the Act).  
20  Du Plessis Reinterpretation 242; De Ville Constitutional Interpretation 146-151. 
21  The need for special protection stems mainly from children's greater vulnerability and immaturity, 
resulting in diminished criminal responsibility. See, from a vast volume of authorities, Centre for 
Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 SACR 477 (CC) paras 
26-28, 35; Keightley "Children and the Legal System" 3; Junger-Tas "Trends in International 
Juvenile Justice" 510-511; Sloth-Nielsen "Chicken Soup" 7; Viljoen "African Charter" 338. 
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conflict with the law" the emphasis is on their rights "not to be detained, except as a 
measure of last resort, and if detained, only for the shortest appropriate period of 
time", and not to be subjected to any harmful practices. The Preamble then spells 
out several aims of the Act, and the following two affect the interpretation of section 
68: (1) whenever "appropriate circumstances" prevail, child offenders should be 
diverted from the criminal justice system; and (2) when diversion is not possible or 
advisable, the child offender should be dealt with "in the criminal justice system in 
child justice courts". When the child offender has to go through the trial process to 
the sentencing phase, the Act specifically sets out to provide "for a wide range of 
appropriate sentencing options specifically suited to the needs of children". The 
Preamble also emphasises "the long-term benefits of a less rigid criminal justice 
process that suits the needs of children in conflict with the law in appropriate cases." 
It also acknowledges that there are resource and other constraints in South African 
society, which might require an incremental implementation of the reformed juvenile 
justice system.   
 
Amongst the various objects of the Act set out in section 2, the following two in 
particular may assist with the interpretation of section 68: (1) protecting the 
constitutional rights of children;22 and (2) encouraging the use of diversion.23 The 
guiding principles in section 3 "must be taken into account" when applying the 
provisions of the Act. Two of these guiding principles are particularly relevant to 
section 68: (1) the principle that a child should not be treated more severely than an 
adult would have been under similar circumstances;24 and (2) that the "rights and 
obligations of children contained in international and regional instruments" also have 
to be taken into account.25  
 
A number of these considerations require closer scrutiny: the best interests of the 
child; the importance of diversion; that children should not be treated more severely 
than adults; and the relevant "international and regional instruments". 
 
2.3 International and regional instruments  
                                                     
22  Section 2(a).  
23  Section 2(d).  
24  Section 3(b). 
25  Section 3(i). 
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The reference to "international and regional instruments" in the Preamble and in 
section 3 means that these documents are not merely of academic or political 
interest, but that every child justice practitioner should have more than a mere 
passing knowledge of their provisions.26 This requirement is supported by section 
39(1)(b) of the Constitution, which requires South African courts to interpret national 
legislation consistently with the provisions of relevant international documents.27 For 
the current purposes the most important instruments are the Convention and the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereafter referred to as "the 
Charter"). Both of these instruments are expressly mentioned in the Preamble.28 
 
The Convention has already been referred to in a number of judgments affecting the 
rights of children, specifically in connection with sentencing.29 The provisions of the 
                                                     
26  For an example of the effect the Convention can have on the practice of child justice, see Long 
2009 Int'l J Children's Rts 155-170 for a discussion of the position in Italian law. It is not always 
known that signatories to these international and regional instruments are expected to report on 
a regular basis on the implementation of their provisions. See Wakefield and Assim 2011 Afr 
Hum Rts L J 699-720 in connection with reporting on the Charter, and Van der Vyver 2006 
Emory Int'l L Rev 34, on implementation of the Convention. 
27  See furhter DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 
(CC) para 75: "In addition [to s 39(1)(b) of the Constitution], under s 233, when interpreting any 
legislation, as we are called upon to do in these cases, we are required to prefer 'any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law'. International law therefore 
provides a useful interpretative tool in the interpretation of the rights in the Bill of Rights." 
28  There are other relevant international instruments. The Convention has been succeeded by 
several documents published by various agencies of the United Nations, often aimed mainly at 
encouraging signatories to further improve their measures and processes in the interests of 
children: see (1) the Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the 
"Beijing Rules") – General Assembly Resolution 40/33 adopted on 29 November 1985; see 
futher, eg, Skelton "Developing a Juvenile Justice System" 186-190; (2) the Rules for the 
Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (the JDL or "Havana Rules") – General 
Assembly Resolution 45/113 adopted on 14 December 1990; see Goldson and Muncie (eds) 
Youth Crime ix; Gallinetti "Child Justice" 636-637; Du Preez and Luyt 2005 CARSA 48; and (3) 
the Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the "Riyadh guidelines") – General 
Assembly Resolution 45/111 adopted on 14 December 1990; see S v B 2006 1 SACR 311 (SCA) 
para 16. For a general discussion of these instruments, with reference to sentencing, see 
Jefferson and Head 2007-2008 Hum Rts & Globalization L Rev 111-117. Although our courts 
have at times referred to these instruments (see further DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC) para 76; S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 
31; S v N 2008 2 SACR 135 (SCA) para 14; S v B 2006 1 SACR 311 (SCA) para 16), they have 
not really affected sentencing practice as such. 
29  See Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 SACR 
477 (CC) para 61; S v N 2008 2 SACR 135 (SCA) para 14; S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 
16; DPP, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 1 SACR 243 (SCA) para 15; S v B 2006 1 SACR 311 (SCA) 
paras 16-20; S v Cloete 2003 2 SACR 489 (O) 494; S v Nkosi 2002 1 SACR 135 (W) 145; S v 
Van Rooyen 2002 1 SACR 608 (C) 610; S v Blaauw 2001 2 SACR 255 (C) 263-264; S v 
Kwalase 2000 2 SACR 135 (C) 138-139. Many of these judgments were written by Van Heerden 
J (as she then was). See also Mahery "Convention on the Rights of the Child" 323. 
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Convention that are of particular relevance to criminal justice include articles 3 (the 
primacy of the child's best interest), 19 (protecting children against any form of 
violence, injury, abuse, maltreatment, etc), 37 (imprisonment as a last resort and for 
the shortest appropriate period; treatment with humanity, respect and dignity) and 40 
(promoting the child's sense of dignity and worth). 30  There is no doubt that the 
Convention's provisions influenced the contents of section 28 of the Constitution. 
They also played a major role in the coming into being of the Act.31 For current 
purposes the Convention is a particularly useful aid to understanding the standard of 
the best interests of- the- child. 
 
Although the Charter has not been as influential as the Convention in shaping the 
Act,32 it has considerable potential to influence the further development of our child 
justice system.33 The Charter has been adopted in Africa in order to address unique 
African concerns about children, and because of frustration with the limited 
involvement of African countries in the drafting of the Convention.34  
 
2.4 The best interests of the child  
 
According to section 28(2) of the Constitution a "child's best interests are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child."35 Since "paramount" is 
a stronger term36 than "a primary" consideration, as used in the Convention,37 or "the 
                                                     
30  Goldson and Muncie (eds) Youth Crime ix-x. 
31  See, eg, DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 
(CC) para 76; Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 25; S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 16. 
32  South Africa ratified the Charter on 7 January 2000, "despite some misgivings": Viljoen "African 
Charter" 349. For these misgivings, see Viljoen 1999 SALJ 660-664. 
33  For one example of its potential for further development, see Gani v S 2011 ZAGPJHC 154 (14 
Oct 2011) para 2: "Article 17 of this Charter specifically provides that every child accused or 
found guilty of infringing a penal law shall have the right to appropriate treatment". 
34  Kaime African Charter on the Child 23. See also, in general, Viljoen "African Charter" 335-348. 
Even before the acceptance of the Children's Charter, the need for the protection of the rights of 
children was recognised in a 18(3) of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981): 
see Kaime African Charter on the Child 22; Viljoen "African Charter" 333 (the practical effect of 
this recognition). 
35  See in general Ngidi "Upholding the Best Interests" 225-242.  
36  "Paramount" means "more important than anything else; supreme": Rhodes University Oxford 
South African Concise Dictionary vide "paramount". See Skelton "Constitutional Protection of 
Children's Rights" 280 ("more emphatic" than international instrument); Mahery "Convention on 
the Rights of the Child" 319 ("a higher standard"); S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 25.  
37  Article 3(1) of the Convention. Alston 1994 IJLF 12 (quoting from UN doc E/CN. 4/1989/48, paras 
121-122) explained that the words "a primary consideration" were preferred to "the primary 
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primary consideration" (the terminology of the African Charter),38 one would have 
thought it safe to conclude that the child's best interests are, in South Africa, more 
important than any other consideration. 39  However, the Constitutional Court has 
consistently rejected this view.40 In Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development41 the Court explained that, although "the child's interests 
are 'more important than anything else'", this did not mean "that everything else is 
unimportant". As the "child's best interests" is not an unlimited right,42 other rights 
also have to be taken into account and, when necessary, given effect to.43 The result 
is that, despite the difference in wording, the child's best interests are of no greater 
importance under the Constitution than under the Convention.44 Nevertheless, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                     
consideration" or "of paramount" importance specifically because "there were situations in which 
the competing interests inter alia of 'justice and society at large, should be of at least equal, if not 
greater, importance than the interests of the child'." The exact wording of a 3(1) of the 
Convention was accepted only after lengthy discussions: see Alston 1994 IJLF 10-11. The rest of 
this article [1-25] is most useful for its consideration of the significance and context of the best 
interests principle, within the Convention as a whole. A vast body of literature exists on this 
principle in the Convention. In addition to the sources referenced in this section, see also 
Zermatten 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 483-499; Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 408-409; McCarney 
"Child-friendly Justice" 119-127; Parker 1994 IJLF 26-41; Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 40; 
Junger-Tas "Trends in International Juvenile Justice" 507; Barratt "Best Interest of the Child" 
145-146; Bennett 1999 Obiter 145-157; Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 618; 
Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 767; Guggenheim 2006 Emory Int'l L Rev 64; Skelton 2011 NJLSP 422. 
38  Article 4 African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981). See, in general, Kaime African 
Charter on the Child 109-119; Viljoen "African Charter" 336; DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC) para 76. With regard to the Convention, 
Alston 1994 IJLF 13 notes that the more specific "the primary consideration" is used in certain 
provisions of the Convention, eg a 37(c) (children and adults should be separated in custody, 
unless it is in the child's best interests not to be separated). 
39  See also Müller and Tait 1999 De Jure 324-325; S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 25. 
40  See further De Reuck v DPP, Witwatersrand Local Division 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) para 55; 
Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 1 SA 1171 (CC) paras 27-30; S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 25. 
Davel "General Principles" 2-12 comments: "It can therefore not necessarily be assumed that the 
best interests of children will always outweigh the constitutional rights of parents, educators or 
other role players." See also Skelton 2008 CCR 360-363. 
41  Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 SACR 477 
(CC) para 29. 
42  For authority that it is a "right", despite its being framed more as a guideline, see, eg, Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC) para 17 ("[s 28(2)], which 
creates a right that is independent of those specified in section 28(1)") and para 77 (per Yacoob 
J for the majority); Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
2009 2 SACR 477 (CC) para 25; S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 14; DPP, Transvaal v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC) para 72. See also, eg, 
Davel "General Principles" 2-10. 
43  See further S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 26; DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 (CC) para 72; Le Roux v Dey 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 
para 49 (per Yacoob J, minority judgment). 
44  See Mahery "Convention on the Rights of the Child" 319-320. 
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difficult to overstate the importance of what has been termed the heart of children's 
rights.45 In S v M46 the Court expressed itself as follows: 
 
The ambit of the provisions [s 28(2) read with s 28(1)]47 is undoubtedly wide. The 
comprehensive and emphatic language of s 28 indicates that just as law 
enforcement must always be gender-sensitive, so must it always be child-sensitive; 
that statutes must be interpreted and the common law developed in a manner which 
favours protecting and advancing the interests of children; and that courts must 
function in a manner which at all times shows due respect for children's rights. 
 
The principle that the child's best interests are "more important than anything else" 
(in other words, that they are paramount) has, since Fletcher v Fletcher,48 been 
considered part of our common law.49 This is applied mostly in matters relating to 
family law, such as the custody of children in divorce proceedings, adoption, foster 
care and so on.50 However, section 28(2) requires acknowledgement of the child's 
best  interests  "in  every  matter concerning  the child”,51  which  would  certainly 
encompass criminal law and criminal justice as well. The extension of the best 
interests principle beyond its application to family law has been precipitated by 
international documents on the rights of children, and specifically by the Convention. 
                                                     
45  Parker 1994 IJLF 27. 
46  S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 15. See also Skelton 2008 CCR 354, 359; Gallinetti 2010 
SAPL 111-116; Erasmus 2010 SAPL 126-129. 
47  See S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 14. 
48  Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 1 SA 130 (A) 134 (per Centlivres JA, for the majority, the real issue "in 
all custody cases is the interests of the child itself"), 143 (per Schreiner JA, minority judgment, 
referring to "the well-established but variously expressed rule that the interest of the children is 
the main or paramount consideration…"), 145 (per Schreiner JA, referring to "…the paramountcy 
of the welfare of the children …"). See also Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 779-780. 
49  See, eg, Jackson v Jackson 2002 2 SA 303 (SCA) 317D-F (the minority judgment); Lubbe v Du 
Plessis 2001 4 SA 57 (C) 66; V v V 1998 4 SA 169 (C) 177; Heaton, Church and Church 
"Marriage" 187; Ngidi "Upholding the Best Interests" 227. See also S v M 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) 
para 12. 
50  See further A S v Vorster 2009 4 SA 108 (SE) 118, 120; AD v DW 2008 3 SA 183 (CC) para 49; 
Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 2 SA 363 (CC) para 24; Central Authority v MV 2011 2 SA 428 
(GNP) para 26; F v F 2006 3 SA 42 (SCA) para 8; B v B 2008 4 SA 535 (W) para 25; Fish Hoek 
Primary School v GW 2010 2 SA 141 (SCA) para 14; GF v SH 2011 3 SA 25 (GNP); Minister of 
Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC). See also Clark 2000 
Stell LR 3-20; Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 751-771; Palmer "Best Interests Criterion" 98-113; Davel 
"General Principles" 2-9 to 2-10; Müller and Tait 1999 De Jure 325; Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur 
2008 Int'l J Children's Rts 21-25. 
51  S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 25 (noted as "the far-reaching phrase"); see also Skelton 
2008 CCR 359. This "phrase" has extended the scope of the principle to all fields of the law: see 
further Davel "General Principles" 2–6 (the application of the principle has gradually "been 
extended far beyond private law disputes"); Müller and Tait 1999 De Jure 322-329. See also a 
3(1) of the Convention; a 4.1 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) 
(African Children's Charter); Kaime African Charter on the Child 110. 
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There is no doubt that the Child Justice Act fully recognises the best-interests 
principle in the field of child criminal justice, as explicitly noted in the Preamble.   
 
A child's best interests play a vital role in the interpretation of any statutory provision 
affecting child offenders. It is a consideration that must be given practical effect 
whenever a question is asked as to the purpose of a specific provision in the Act. As 
is normally the case, what is actually in the best interests of a child offender during 
the sentencing process can be established only through careful analysis of all of the 
facts relevant to the matter at hand.52 Courts have wide discretionary powers to 
ensure that effect is given to the best interests of children.53 They have to make 
sense of the "almost endless" number of factors54 involved in every individual case in 
order to properly exercise the value judgment that any decision about the best 
interests inevitably requires.55 
 
In closing it should be noted that most of the other rights in section 28 give effect to 
the best-interests principle (eg, the rights to parental or appropriate alternative care, 
to basic nutrition and other services, protection "from maltreatment, neglect, abuse 
or degradation",56 and so on). In addition, children are obviously also entitled to the 
other constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights.57  Specifically related to sentencing, 
these rights include the rights to life, to dignity, a fair trial, and not to be punished in a 
cruel, inhuman or degrading manner, to state the most obvious examples.58  
 
2.5 The importance of diversion  
 
                                                     
52  Lubbe v Du Plessis 2001 4 SA 57 (C) 66E; F v F 2006 3 SA 42 (SCA) paras 8-9; J v J 2008 6 SA 
30 (C) para 20 (all the facts, including likely future occurences); AD v DW 2008 3 SA 183 (CC) 
para 50. See also Davel "General principles" 2–7; Heaton, Church and Church "Marriage" 187; 
Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 40. 
53  Junger-Tas "Trends in International Juvenile Justice" 507. 
54   S v M  2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) para 24. 
55  P v P 2007 5 SA 94 (SCA) para 14. See also Davel "General Principles" 2–7; Bekink and Bekink 
Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 40. 
56  Section 28(1)(d) of the Constitution. 
57  See further Gallinetti 2010 SAPL 118-119. Some exceptions have been noted: see further 
Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" 277-279 (eg, with respect to corporal 
punishment in a non-criminal setting); Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 600. 
58  See also Terblanche and van Vuren 1997 SACJ 184. A 37 of the Convention also outlaws "cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment". 
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It is one of the central themes of the Act that children in conflict with the law should 
be diverted from the formal criminal justice system whenever possible.59 Generally, 
diversion means that an accused person is not put through formal criminal 
proceedings but is subjected to an alternative process that does not involve a formal 
trial, conviction and a criminal record. 60  No sentence is imposed, although the 
alternative process may require the person to perform services or tasks, or to submit 
to training or other regimes, some of which might be of a punitive nature.  
 
Diversion is widely considered to provide people in conflict with the law with a better 
opportunity of being successfully reintegrated into society than dealing with their 
behaviour through the formal criminal justice system.61 There is abundant evidence 
that the deeper child offenders get involved in the formal criminal justice system, the 
better the chances are that, as adults, they will end up living a life of crime.62  
 
2.6 Children not to be treated more severely than adults 
 
This guiding principle63 has probably been inserted into the Act in order to allay fears 
that the Act was too child-friendly or would result in responses that are not 
sufficiently punitive.64 There are no equivalent provisions in either the Convention or 
the Charter, nor the earlier Beijing Rules. In fact, all indications from these 
instruments are that children should be treated less severely than adults. Van 
Bueren, one of the most influential authors on the Convention, writes as follows on 
this issue: 65 
 
                                                     
59  See further the Preamble; s 2(d) (it is one of the Act's objectives). The whole ch 8 of the Act 
deals with diversion. For more detail about diversion in the Act, see Gallinetti "Child Justice" 656-
658; Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti 2011 PELJ 74-77; Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 
74-79; Gallinetti Getting to Know the Child Justice Act 43-50. See further also Maguire 2012 New 
Crim L Rev 72, 79-83 (the Act establishes "a large-scale diversion programme"). 
60  See, eg, Gallinetti, Muntingh and Skelton "Child Justice Concepts" 32; SA Law Commission 
Issue Paper para 7.1 et seq; Bedu 2009 Law, Democracy and Development 96. S 1 of the Act 
defines diversion as "diversion of a matter involving a child away from the formal court 
procedures", which is not particularly helpful.  
61  See further Skelton "Developing a Juvenile Justice System" 188-189. See also Gani v S 2011 
ZAGPJHC 154 (14 Oct 2011) paras 13-20, where the court found that the case of a child with a 
previous conviction for shoplifting is precisely the kind of case that should now be diverted. 
62  See further Goldson and Muncie (eds) Youth Crime xviii (as only one example of many sources). 
63  From s 3(b) of the Act. 
64  See, for some indication of this, Maguire 2012 New Crim L Rev 108, 111. 
65  Van Bueren International Law 184 (emphasis added). 
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Another fundamental principle of sentencing is that deprivation of liberty, if used at 
all, should only be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate 
period of time. Consequently, the international law regulating the sentencing of 
children is characterised by an emphasis on the constructive purpose of the 
disposition rather than its punitive side. Specifically, and in contrast to adults, 
international law places restrictions on the periods for which children can be deprived 
of their liberty. 
Although the passage quoted refers to sentencing and more specifically to the 
deprivation of liberty, its essence permeates the provisions of the Convention with 
respect to juvenile justice:66 children must be treated in ways reflecting their age; the 
successful reintegration of child offenders into society is the desirable outcome;67 
and the treatment must be proportionate to the child's circumstances and the 
offence.68 Given these principles, which have to be taken into account as guiding 
principles as well,69 it is difficult to see how even treatment equal to that of an adult 
offender could be justified – after all, none of these considerations apply to adult 
offenders. 
 
3 The basic provision on sentencing: section 68  
 
3.1 "A child justice court…" 
 
It is striking that the Act does not explicitly establish child justice courts.70 Instead, it 
defines a "child justice court"71 as "any court provided for in the Criminal Procedure 
                                                     
66  Van Bueren International Law 169-199. See also, in connection with the African Charter, 
Wakefield and Assim 2011 Afr Hum Rts L J 716 (institutionalisation should be kept to a 
minimum). 
67  Article 40(1) of the Convention. 
68  Article 40(3)(b) of the Convention. 
69  In terms of s 3(i) of the Act. 
70  Such establishment was proposed by the South African Law Commission for the child justice 
courts (see further cl 1 of the proposed Bill: a child justice court is defined as "the court described 
in section 71" and "court" as "a child justice court or any other court acting in terms of the 
provisions of this Act"; cl 71 would establish child justice courts at the level of district magistrates' 
courts, involving regional and High Courts, especially to hear more serious cases). See also ch 9 
(paras 9.1-9.46). The more familiar practice in our law is to explicitly establish a court and to 
circumscribe its powers in legislation. Accordingly, eg, children's courts are specifically 
established in terms of the Children's Act 38 of 2005: every "magistrates" court, as defined in the 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 "… shall be a children's court…" (s 42). For other examples, 
see the establishment of land claims courts in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 
1994; small claims courts in terms of the Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 1984; equality courts in 
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Act [51 of 1977], dealing with the bail application, plea, trial or sentencing of a child". 
The reference to the Criminal Procedure Act in this definition is surprising, as that 
Act does not establish any courts, nor does it generally determine their jurisdiction. It 
does make provision for "magistrates' courts", "lower courts", "superior courts" and 
"supreme courts".72 The sentencing of offenders is one of the functions of all these 
courts. It is a fairly safe assumption that the legislature intended to declare that all of 
the courts that are involved in the criminal procedure of the country (dealing with 
"bail application, plea, trial or sentencing") are "child justice courts" when they apply 
or are required to apply the provisions of the Act. In other words, district magistrates' 
courts, regional courts and high courts may all operate as child justice courts. Other 
commentators on the Act also assume this to be the position.73  
 
Of course, by the time that the proceedings have reached the sentencing phase, 
there should be little doubt whether the court is a child justice court or not. The issue 
should be dealt with during the plea and trial stage and the Act specifically requires, 
in section 63(1)(a), that the trial of a child74 has to be conducted in a child justice 
court: 75 
 
Any child whose matter has been referred to the child justice court in terms of 
section 49(2), must appear before a court with the requisite jurisdiction to be dealt 
with in terms of this Chapter. 
 
In order to better comprehend this provision, one must briefly note the basic 
elements of the new child justice system. The first process is referred to as the 
preliminary enquiry, an informal process which serves as a child suspect's first court 
appearance. 76  If the child had been arrested, the preliminary enquiry must, in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000; and 
maintenance courts in terms of the Maintenance Act 99 of 1998. 
71  Section 1 of the Act. 
72  Section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
73  See further Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 28-60 (child offenders who are not diverted 
"are dealt with in Child Justice Courts"); Gallinetti Getting to Know the Child Justice Act 13 (even 
a high court applying the provisions of the Act is a child justice court for these purposes) 51; 
Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti 2011 PELJ 84 (most cases will be tried in the lower courts). 
74  "Child" should also be understood as intended by the Act. See, in this connection, 3.4 below. 
75  "[This] chapter" refers to chapter 9, the chapter dealing with trials in the child justice court. 
76  A preliminary enquiry is a requirement (s 5(3)), unless the child has been taken out of the child 
justice process already. See, in general, Gallinetti "Child Justice" 653-654; Kruger Hiemstra's 
Criminal Procedure 28-60. See s 43(3)(c), confirming that the preliminary enquiry amounts to the 
"first appearance before a lower court". 
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principle, take place within 48 hours of the arrest. 77 The enquiry is conducted by a 
magistrate in the presence of the child, a parent (or other person to support the 
child), a prosecutor and a probation officer. 78 Its main aim is to ensure that the 
child's case does not get lost in the system. At some point in the process the 
probation officer must formally assess the child in order to inform the decision of the 
enquiry magistrate as to the best next step to take. One of the outcomes of such an 
enquiry is that the child may be ordered to appear before a child justice court for trial. 
In fact, as is clearly implied by section 63(1)(a), a child can be referred to court for 
trial only following a preliminary enquiry.  
 
Section 63(1)(a) requires that the child justice court must have "the requisite 
jurisdiction". This is the only reference in the Act to the jurisdiction of this court. A 
court may lack "the requisite jurisdiction" because of the crime of which the accused 
is charged. For example, a district magistrates' court does not have the jurisdiction to 
try an adult offender for rape, murder or high treason, and a regional court not for 
high treason.79 Although there are no specific provisions in the Act confirming such 
limitations in the case of child justice courts, the limitations are confirmed by the 
following basic principles and objects of the Act:80 to protect the rights of children in 
general,81 to ensure that they are not treated more severely than adults,82 and that 
their best interests are of paramount importance throughout. 
 
The same considerations as those noted above indicate that it is also safe to 
assume that the various courts retain the punitive jurisdiction that they have for adult 
offenders, in so far as such jurisdiction is not expressly changed by the Act. In other 
words, a magistrate's court acting as a child justice court will normally be limited to 
imprisonment of three years per offence, or fines of up to R 60 000; a regional court 
will normally be limited to imprisonment of 15 years per offence, or fines of up to R 
300 000; high courts are limited to 25 years' imprisonment,83 but the maximum fine is 
                                                     
77  Gallinetti "Child Justice" 654 (it is possible for the enquiry to be postponed, for not more than 
another 96 hours, under certain conditions – ss 48(1) read with 48(2)). 
78  Gallinetti "Child Justice" 654.  
79  See s 89(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944.  
80  As provided for specifically in the Preamble, and in ss 2 and 3: see 2 above.  
81  Section 2(a). 
82  Section 3(b). 
83  The longest sentence permitted by s 77(4) of the Act. 
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unlimited.84  As  always,  these limitations  are  subject  to  express  statutory 
exceptions.85 
 
It is unfortunate that the Act does not expressly create child justice courts and that it 
does not state explicitly that child offenders are now to be tried and sentenced in a 
different, child-focused and child-friendly court.86 The Act would have been clearer in 
this respect if the statement in the Preamble "while children whose matters are not 
diverted, are to be dealt with in the criminal justice system in child justice courts" was 
followed with an explicit creation of such courts in the Act itself.  
 
It is worth noting (even if ex abundanti cautela) that child justice courts are different 
from children's courts, which are established in terms of the Children's Act 38 of 
2005. Children's courts are aimed at protecting the general welfare and well-being of 
children.87 In particular, this includes the care, support and adoption of children, as 
well as the care of children in care centres and similar institutions.88 Section 45(2) 
specifically declares that a children's court does not have jurisdiction to try any 
person on a criminal charge.89 These considerations clearly show that the Children's 
Act follows a so-called welfare or "welfarist" approach, in contrast to the justice 
approach followed by the Act.90  
 
3.2 "…after convicting…" 
 
                                                     
84  See Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (2007) 14, for a summary of these jurisdictional limitations.  
85  Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (2007) 14. 
86  The proposals by the SA Law Commission were much more explicit in this respect (see SA Law 
Commission Discussion Paper clause 53; SA Law Commission Report clause 71), although not 
without their own problems. See Ehlers Child Justice 11-13 for a discussion of the various 
models considered. 
87  See Preamble, s 45 Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
88  Section 45(1)(j) Children's Act 38 of 2005. See also Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure 28-62. 
The same situation applied in terms of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, the predecessor of the 
Children's Act. See SA Law Commission Discussion Paper para 10.4. 
89  There are two exceptions (s 45(2)(a)), namely non-compliance with an order of a children's court 
and contempt of court. It would probably have been better had these exceptions been left for 
child justice courts to deal with, as the present arrangement negatively impacts on the non-
criminal nature of children's courts.  
90  See further, eg, Ehlers Child Justice 13-14. On the distinction between "welfare" and "justice" as 
central themes of child justice, see Easton and Piper Sentencing and Punishment 246-249; 
Skelton 2011 NJLSP 414-417 (the development of welfarism); Ehlers Child Justice 16-18; 
Human "Theory of Children's Rights" 246-247; and Doob and Tonry "Varieties of Youth Justice" 
12-16. 
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As with all offenders, sentencing is possible only after the conviction of an offence.91 
This characteristic establishes an important difference between the basic underlying 
philosophies of the Act and that of the Children's Act.  
 
No offences are excluded from the operation of the Act, which "applies to all criminal 
offences".92 These offences are categorised into three schedules to the Act, which 
are arranged roughly in terms of seriousness: the least serious offences are in 
Schedule 193 and the most serious in Schedule 3.94 
 
3.3 "…a child…" 
 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
Nowadays, when reference is made in legislation to "a child", it is not unfair to 
assume that it refers to a person under the age of 18 years. Certainly, such an 
assumption would be supported by the Constitution, in terms of which a "child" is 
someone under the age of 18.95  
 
However, it is immediately evident why, whenever the phrase "a child" is used in the 
Act in general, and in section 68 in particular, it could not always refer to a person 
under the age of 18. The problem is this: offenders who committed their crimes as 
children might no longer be children by the time they appear in the child justice court 
for trial and sentence. This problem is particularly acute in South Africa, where 
criminal cases can take years to complete, and where there are many examples of 
child offenders who are sentenced long after they had committed their crimes.96 The 
reasons for this apparent anomaly range from the delayed laying of charges to 
problems relating to the apprehension of the offender, and sometimes simply the 
                                                     
91  This is a requirement of the legality principle, in terms of which only criminal conduct can be 
punished. See Rabie, Strauss and Maré Punishment 6-7, 81-89; Snyman Criminal Law 48-49. 
92  Gallinetti "Child Justice" 649. 
93  Some of the most serious of these offences include theft involving property of an amount not 
exceeding R 2 500; fraud not exceeding an amount of more than R 1 500; unlawful possession of 
certain drugs; consensual "statutory rape"; common assault, etc. 
94  Including crimes such as treason, murder, rape, aggravated robbery, and so on. 
95  Section 28(3) of the Constitution. Of course, this definition is directly aimed at interpreting section 
28 of the Constitution. It does not necessarily export to other legislation as well. 
96  See further S v Dayile 2011 1 SACR 245 (ECG) (who committed the crime at 17, but was 
sentenced only 10 years later). 
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inertia of the criminal justice system. Finally, some prosecutors and other officials 
might be tempted to delay proceedings until the offender's eighteenth birthday simply 
in order to prevent the protection of the Act from applying to the offender.97  
There are two sides to this coin. On the one hand, delays in the system should not 
remove any child from the protection provided by the Act for no fault of his or her 
own. On the other hand, someone much older than 18 at the time of sentencing 
might, for that reason alone, not be a suitable candidate for the sentences provided 
for in Chapter 10, or be in need of the protection offered by the Act. 
 
It is the intention of the Convention that child offenders should be treated differently 
from their adult counterparts.98 The age of "under 18" is the international standard 
reflected in the Convention 99  and all related documents, including the African 
Children's Charter. These instruments also informed the rights in section 28 of the 
Constitution in this respect. The important result is that all persons who were under 
18 years when they committed their offences should, ideally, be given the "benefits 
and protections" of the Bill of Rights for as long as this is the cut off age.100 The 
question is how this ideal can be achieved in the case of child offenders without 
burdening the courts with offenders who, despite being children at the time of the 
crime, are much older during sentencing.101 The way in which the Act approaches 
this issue is considered next, and it is useful to separate offenders who are children 
(under 18) during sentencing from those who are no longer children at the time of 
sentencing.  
                                                     
97  Section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 specifically aims to monitor unreasonable 
delays in finalising criminal proceedings (see further Du Toit et al Commentary 33–16 to 33–16D, 
discussing some case law in this regard). Every accused person has the right "to have their trial 
begin and conclude without unreasonable delay" (s 35(3)(d) of the Constitution), as part of the 
right to a fair trial, but applicants find it hard to convince the courts that delays were 
unreasonable to the extent that they are entitled to some kind of remedy. See eg S v Pennington 
1999 2 SACR 329 (CC) para 41; Broome v DPP, Western Cape 2008 1 SACR 178 (C) paras 44-
48, for an overview of the law; also Snyckers and Le Roux "Criminal Procedure" 51–123 to 51–
134.  
98  See further Van Bueren International Law 184 
99  See Goldson and Muncie (eds) Youth Crime ix: "The presumption within the [Convention] is that 
the term 'child' refers to 'every human being below the age of eighteen years". 
100  See further Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) para 39. 
101  In terms of the proposals in SA Law Commission Report para 3.6 the juvenile justice legislation 
would have applied to all persons who were children at the time of the offence. The draft 
legislation specifically provided that the child justice legislation would apply "until conclusion of 
such proceedings, despite the fact that such person may have reached the age of 18 years 
during the course of such proceedings" (cl 2(4)). For a brief exposition of the position in Ghana, 
see Ame 2011 Int'l J Children's Rts 274-275. 
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3.3.2 The child offender is under 18 during sentencing 
 
The Act defines a child as, in the first instance, any person under 18 years of age.102 
This description is consistent with the Constitution103 and other legislation affecting 
children, such as the Children's Act 38 of 2005. When the offender appearing before 
the child justice court for sentencing is under 18 years old, the position is clear: the 
court must sentence such an offender in terms of section 68, and it must apply all of 
the principles relevant to the sentencing of children.  
 
3.3.3 The child offender is 18 or older when sentenced 
 
When the child offender has reached the age of 18, the problems referred to earlier 
may arise. The Act attempts to solve these problems by focusing on the age of the 
offender when the criminal proceedings are instituted. The relevant provision, section 
4(1)(b), reads as follows: 
 
Subject to subsection (2), this Act applies to any person in the Republic who 
is alleged to have committed an offence and …  
(b)  was 10 years or older104 but under the age of 18 years when he or she 
was— 
(i)  handed a written notice in terms of section 18 or 22; 
(ii)  served with a summons in terms of section 19; or 
(iii)  arrested in terms of section 20, 
for that offence. 
 
The processes noted in paragraphs (i) to (iii), involving sections 18 to 20 and 22 of 
the Act, relate to the different ways in which the presence of the accused at the 
criminal proceedings can be ensured. The implication of section 4(1)(b) is clear that 
                                                     
102  Section 1 of the Act.  
103  Section 28(3) of the Constitution. See also Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's 
Rights" 279. 
104  Children under the age of 10 do not have criminal capacity and they cannot be prosecuted (or 
convicted) for any offence – s 7(1). When such a child commits an act that would otherwise have 
been criminal the child has to be dealt with in terms of s 9, which provides for a hearing by a 
children's court and various other measures. See eg Gallinetti "Child Justice" 649-650. 
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when these proceedings are instituted before the offender's eighteenth birthday, the 
provisions of the Act apply. Taken literally, even if the proceedings then take 
another, for argument's sake, ten years to complete, they will still have to take place 
in a child justice court, despite the fact that such a person might be 28 years old by 
the time of sentencing. 
 
What should the position be if the proceedings were instituted when the accused 
was under 18 years of age, but the proceedings were interrupted for some reason? 
At least two situations could be distinguished. First, if the case is withdrawn by the 
prosecution and reinstituted when the accused is 18 years old or older, the 
reinstitution should amount to a separate process unaffected by section 4.105 Such a 
process is not problematic unless the case is withdrawn simply as a means to 
circumvent having to charge the accused in a child justice court. Secondly, when a 
case is interrupted because the accused fails to return to court after a postponement 
of the matter or to comply with bail conditions, a new case is not opened and the 
original case number remains in place. In this case there would be little reason to 
deviate from the earlier stated position, namely that the case should be dealt with in 
the child justice court even if the proceedings drag on until the accused is much 
older than 18 years of age. 
 
The provisions of section 4(1)(b) apply "subject to subsection (2)". Section 4(2) of the 
Act does not limit the position just explained, but actually extends it, as the 
subsection permits persons of 18 years old (and even older) to be tried and 
sentenced in terms of the sentencing provisions of the Act. It reads as follows: 
 
The Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction may, in accordance 
with directives issued by the National Director of Public Prosecutions in terms 
of section 97(4)(a)(i)(aa),106 in the case of a person who— 
(a) is alleged to have committed an offence when he or she was under the 
age of 18 years; and 
                                                     
105  An accused person is not entitled to a verdict when the charge has been withdrawn (s 6(a) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977). A new prosecution may be taken up at any later stage – 
Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 71. 
106  These directives were published on 31 March 2010. See also Badenhorst Implementation of the 
Child Justice Act 10. 
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(b) is 18 years or older but under the age of 21 years, at the time referred to in 
subsection (1)(b), 
direct that the matter be dealt with in terms of section 5(2) to (4).107  
 
It remains an absolute requirement that the alleged offence must have been 
committed while the offender was under the age of 18 years. Section 4(2) permits 
the prosecution to be instituted subsequently, as long as the accused is under the 
age of 21 and it is permissible in terms of the NDPP directives. Once such an 
accused has been convicted by a child justice court, sentencing will also have to 
take place in terms of the Act.  
 
The NDPP directives contain a list of considerations that are set in the alternative 
(they are separated by "or"). These considerations are any of the following:108 
(a) the offence is a Schedule 1 offence, in other words, listed with the least 
serious offences;109 or 
(b) the co-accused is a child;110 or 
(c) there is doubt about the accused's age; or  
(d) the accused "appears to be intellectually or developmentally challenged"; 
or 
(e) "where other pertinent and relevant circumstances so demand, such as 
those listed in paragraph J.2 above".111 
It is striking that undue delay in the institution of the proceedings is not mentioned as 
a factor, although it could potentially be included within (e) above. 
 
The directives indicate that section 4(2) is unlikely to find frequent application. 
Although children frequently commit the kind of offences listed in Schedule 1, it is the 
                                                     
107  Also note the definition in s 1 of an "adult", which "means a person who is 18 years or older but 
does not include a person referred to in section 4(2)". 
108  NDPP "Directives" para M.4. 
109  For examples of these offences, see fn 102 above. 
110  NDPP "Directives" para M.8 adds that a "...direction should generally not be given where the co-
accused are adults, unless the person was used by them to commit the crime." 
111  These circumstances, listed in NDPP "Directives" para J.2, include the following: the offender 
was particularly youthful when the offence was committed; the child experiences "particular 
hardship, vulnerability or handicap", such as being the head of a household; and diminished 
criminal responsibility. 
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clear intention of the Act that the vast majority of these offences should be diverted 
rather than committed for trial.112 
 
When the offender is 21 years of age or older when criminal proceedings are 
initiated,113 regardless of whether or not the crime was committed when this person 
was still a child, the Act cannot find application. Such a person can be charged, tried 
and sentenced only in terms of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
 
3.4 "…must … impose a sentence in accordance with this Chapter." 
 
3.4.1 What the child justice court has to do 
 
The last part of section 68 requires the child justice court to impose a sentence, and 
to do so "in accordance" with the chapter of which section 68 is part, namely chapter 
10.  The phrase "in accordance with" points towards procedure, as it means "in a 
manner conforming with". 114  Is there any significance to this choice of words? 
Certainly, chapter 10 contains both procedural and substantive provisions. Section 
69, which contains the basic principles of sentencing, is a substantive provision, as 
are those sections containing the different sentencing options.115 Sections 70, 71 
and 79 are purely procedural provisions, but many of the other provisions also 
contain procedural parts.116 There is no indication that the legislature attempted to 
separate substantive from procedural aspects in chapter 10, and it will be difficult to 
sustain any significance to the words "in accordance with". It is submitted that it was 
the intention of the legislature simply to point a child justice court to the provisions of 
chapter 10 as a first port of call after the conviction of a child offender. 
 
                                                     
112  See further, in particular, s 52(2) of the Act, which unconditionally permits the diversion of 
Schedule1 offences. 
113  As would happen when the victim of a crime lays a charge only many years after the event (see 
further S v Cornick 2007 2 SACR 115 (SCA) (complaint laid 19 years after the crime of rape); 
Bothma v Els 2010 1 SACR 184 (CC) (prosecution instituted on a rape committed 39 years 
earlier) or if the offender is found only many years after the fact; S v Acting Regional Magistrate, 
Boksburg 2011 2 SACR 274 (CC) (complaint laid only three years after the commission of the 
crime). See also Van Zijl v Hoogenhout 2005 2 SA 93 (SCA). 
114  Rhodes University Oxford South African concise dictionary vide "accordance". 
115  Sections 72-78 of the Act. 
116  Eg s 74(3), in connection with fines; s 76(3)(b), in connection with reports by a child and youth 
care centre; s 77(5), requiring the antedating of prison sentences under certain circumstances; 
and so on. 
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The sentences in chapter 10 are the following: community-based sentences, 
restorative justice sentences, a fine, correctional supervision, residence in a child 
and youth care centre, and imprisonment. Most of these sentences may also be 
imposed as suspended sentences. 
3.4.2 The incorporation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 
 
Although sentencing must take place in terms of the provisions of the Act, it is 
immediately apparent that chapter 10 of the Act is not self-contained. It does not 
contain all of the powers necessary to enable the child justice court to give the 
offender a fair sentencing hearing. There are several provisions in the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 with no equivalent in the Child Justice Act, but which are 
essential in the interests of child offenders, the victims of the crimes and/or the 
administration of justice. Such provisions include, for example, the authority to permit 
evidence necessary for the court to be properly informed about an appropriate 
sentence,117 the right of the defence to produce evidence on sentencing and to 
address the court on a proper sentence,118 the power of one presiding officer to 
impose sentence when the officer who convicted the offender is not available,119 the 
power to order sentences to be served concurrently,120 and the power to correct an 
incorrectly passed sentence.121  
 
It is exactly for this reason that parts of the Criminal Procedure Act are expressly 
incorporated into the Act. Two provisions contain a general incorporation of the 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, namely sections 4(3)(a) and 63(1)(b). It 
needs to be established if these provisions also affect the sentencing phase, and to 
this end they need to be considered separately. 
 
  
                                                     
117  Section 274(1) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
118  Section 274(2) Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
119  Section 275 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
120  Section 280 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
121  Section 298 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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3.4.3 Section 4(3)(a) 
 
Section 4(3)(a) reads as follows: 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act applies with the necessary changes as may be 
required by the context to any person referred to in this section, except in so far as 
this Act provides for amended, additional or different provisions or procedures in 
respect of that person. 
 
This provision is intended as a "catch-all" provision for the application of the Act.122 It 
contains two conditions for the provision of the Criminal Procedure Act to apply to a 
child justice court: 
1) the Child Justice Act does not provide "for amended, additional or different 
provisions or procedures"; and 
2) the Criminal Procedure Act "applies … to any person referred to in this 
section".  
Section 4(3) is so adamant about this "person" that it also links the "amended, 
additional or different provisions or procedures" to such a person (by reading 
"amended, additional or different provisions or procedures in respect of that person" 
– emphasis added). The next question is who "any person" could refer to. It is firstly 
limited to "any person referred to in this section", clearing meaning section 4. The 
only persons that are referred to in section 4 are children and young adults who 
allegedly committed an offence.123 As judicial officers are not referred to in section 4 
at all, those powers in the Criminal Procedure Act given to judicial officers in order to 
facilitate the sentencing process or the sentences themselves cannot be read into 
this provision and, strictly speaking, such provisions in chapters 27 and 28 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act cannot be incorporated into the Child Justice Act in terms of 
section 4(3)(a). 
 
  
                                                     
122  See further the heading to s 4 of the Act. 
123  Although the NDPP and the DPP are also mentioned, they are not involved in the substance of 
sentencing. It is not even clear that such state officials could be a "person" (see, regarding 
whether or not organs of state are considered "persons", De Ville Constitutional Interpretation 
109, contra Du Plessis Reinterpretation 208). 
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3.4.4 Section 63(1)(b) 
 
In terms of section 63(1)(b), the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act relating to 
plea and trial proceedings have to be followed by child justice courts. It reads as 
follows: 
 
A child justice court must apply the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Act relating to plea and trial of accused persons, as extended or amended by the 
provisions as set out in this Chapter [9] and Chapter 10. 
 
The question is if this provision also involves the sentencing stage of criminal 
proceedings. The word "trial" is sometimes interpreted to include the sentencing 
phase as well. 124  For example, in S v Khuzwayo 125  the court rejected the trial 
magistrate's statement that diversion is possible only before conviction, clearly 
assuming that the "trial" 126  includes the sentencing phase. For the purposes of 
interpreting section 63, such an inclusion is supported by the fact that chapter 10, 
which deals with sentencing, is specifically mentioned. However, the issue is 
confused by the inclusion of the term "plea". Since the plea stage might also be 
considered part of "a trial", the fact that it is specifically used would indicate that the 
term "trial" as used here should be understood in accordance with its narrow 
meaning, being the process subsequent to the plea, until the court's conviction or 
acquittal.127 In the end, it is difficult to find a clear indication of the legislature's 
intention with respect to the question of whether or not section 63(1)(b) should be 
extended to the sentencing phase. 
 
3.4.5 Assessment 
 
Neither section 4(3)(a) nor section 63(1)(b) provide for a clear incorporation of the 
sentencing provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act into the Child Justice Act.  
 
                                                     
124  For example, there is no doubt that the right to a fair trial (s 35(1) of the Constitution) extends to 
the sentencing phase as well (see Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (2007) 12).  
125  S v Khuzwayo Unreported Case Nr 65/2012 (GSJ) (31 May 2012) paras 3-4. The court did not 
explain its assumption. 
126  As used in s 52(1) of the Act. 
127  Such an interpretation would be favoured by the presumption that the inclusion of one thing 
means the exclusion of the other (inclusion unius est alterius exclusion): see further De Ville 
Constitutional Interpretation 131; Steyn and Van Tonder Uitleg van Wette 206-207. 
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There is no elegant solution to this problem. It is submitted that the following 
approach, given the general mood of the Act and its interpretive tools, is the best 
indication of the intention of the legislature. Section 4(3)(a) should be given a wider, 
"purposive" interpretation, not limited to the provisions in the Criminal Procedure Act 
that deal only with "any person", so that it applies to all of the sentencing provisions 
in chapters 27 and 28 of the Criminal Procedure Act, except in so far as any such 
provision or procedure has been amended or added to by the Child Justice Act, or in 
so far as they differ from those in the Criminal Procedure Act (in accordance with the 
words in s 4(3)(a) "amended, additional or different provisions or procedures"). Such 
an approach would obviate the need to include the sentencing stage into the 
provisions of section 63(1)(b). 
 
This conclusion would mean that all of the provisions noted above as being in the 
interests of the offender must be complied with by a child justice court. The same 
position should apply, for example, to section 271 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
which specifically permits the prosecution to prove the offender's record of previous 
convictions. Other provisions which should be included are those dealing with fines: 
section 287 permits a sentencing court to impose a fine with alternative 
imprisonment, and sections 288 and 289 provide ways to recover a fine that has not 
been paid.  
 
However, the sentences provided for in the Child Justice Act differ from those in the 
Criminal Procedure Act and it is submitted that section 4(3)(a) cannot be used to 
incorporate the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act in connection with the 
nature of the sentences that may be imposed. Therefore, a child justice court may 
impose only those sentences specifically contained in chapter 10 of the Act and not, 
for example, sentences such as periodical imprisonment or committal to a treatment 
centre.128 Although this conclusion is not very clear from the above approach, it is 
submitted that it is the closest to the original intention of the legislature, as indicated 
in the Preamble and other interpretive tools in the Act. In particular, these 
considerations include the best interests of the child, and the need for sentencing 
measures "specifically suited to the needs of children".   
                                                     
128  As provided for in s 296 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
It will not be possible to achieve the aims of the Child Justice Act through a too 
legalistic and literal interpretation of its provisions. Equally, it is impossible to 
consider its provisions on sentencing in isolation. The result is that, even when 
considering a provision as short and apparently to the point as section 68, there are 
no shortcuts to finding the legislature's true intentions.  
Some of the potential pitfalls of section 68 include that the "child" offender who has 
to be sentenced need not be a "child", a person under 18 years old, which is what 
the term is lately generally taken to mean. And one of the biggest challenges is going 
to be to convince all role players that the sentences for child offenders are limited to 
those contained in the Act itself. 
 
In essence there are two measures for the success of the new child justice system. 
The first is how many children can be effectively diverted from the criminal justice 
system. The second measure is, when they cannot be diverted, how effective their 
sentences will be. A proper understanding of section 68 provides a corner stone for a 
foundation to effective sentencing in terms of the Child Justice Act. 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
462 / 638 
 
Bibliography 
 
Alston 1994 IJLF 
Alston P "The Best Interests Principle: Towards a Reconciliation of Culture 
and Human Rights" 1994 IJLF 1-25 
 
Ame 2011 Int'l J Children's Rts 
Ame RK "The Rights of Children in Conflict with the Law in Ghana" 2011 Int'l J 
Children's Rts 271-293 
 
Badenhorst Implementation of the Child Justice Act 
Badenhorst C Overview of the Implementation of the Child Justice Act, 2008 
(Act 75 of 2008) (Open Society Foundation Pinelands 2011) 
 
Barratt "Best Interest of the Child" 
Barratt A "'The Best Interest of the Child' – Where is the Child's Voice?" in 
Burman S (ed) The Fate of the Child: Legal Decisions on Children in the New 
South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2003) 145-157 
 
Bedu 2009 Law, Democracy and Development 
Bedu R "The Final Curtain Call for the 'Minimum Sentences Act'" 2009 Law, 
Democracy and Development 96-104 
 
Bekink and Bekink 2004 De Jure 
Bekink B and Bekink M "Defining the Standard of the Best Interest of the 
Child: Modern South African Perspectives" 2004 De Jure 21-40 
 
Bennett 1999 Obiter 
Bennett TW "The best interests of the child in an African context" 1999 Obiter 
145-157 
 
Bonthuys 2002 SALJ 
Bonthuys E "The South African Bill of Rights and the development of family 
law" 2002 SALJ 748-782 
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
463 / 638 
 
Clark 2000 Stell LR 
Clark B "'A golden thread?' Some aspects of the application of the standard of 
the best interests of the child in South African law" 2000 Stell LR 3-20 
 
Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 
Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (Juta Cape Town 
2005) 
 
Davel "General Principles" 
Davel T "General Principles" in Davel CJ and Skelton AM (eds) Commentary 
on the Children's Act (Juta Cape Town 2007, updated to 2011)  
 
De Ville Constitutional Interpretation 
De Ville JR Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (Interdoc Consultants 
Goodwood 2000)  
 
Doob and Tonry "Varieties of Youth Justice" 
Doob AN and Tonry M "Varieties of Youth Justice" in Tonry M and Doob AN 
(eds) Youth Crime and Youth Justice: Comparative and Cross-National 
Perspectives (University of Chicago Press Chicago, Ill 2004) 1-20 
 
Du Plessis "Interpretation"  
Du Plessis LM "Statute Law and Interpretation" in Joubert WA and Faris JA 
(eds) The Law of South Africa: Vol 25(1) 2nd ed (LexisNexis Durban 2010) 
211-417 
 
Du Plessis Re-interpretation  
Du Plessis L Re-interpretation of Statutes (Butterworths Durban 2002)  
 
Du Preez and Luyt 2005 CARSA 
Du Preez N and Luyt WFM "Children in conflict with the law: South African 
perspectives and private company involvement" 2005 CARSA 48-55  
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
464 / 638 
 
Du Toit et al Commentary  
Du Toit E et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act (Juta Cape Town 
1987, Service 47 2011)  
 
Easton and Piper Sentencing and Punishment  
Easton S and Piper C Sentencing and Punishment: The Quest for Justice 2nd 
ed (Oxford University Press Oxford 2008) 
 
Ehlers Child Justice 
Ehlers L Child Justice (Open Society Foundation Pinelands 2006) 
 
Erasmus 2010 SAPL 
Erasmus D "'There is something you are missing; What about the children?': 
Separating the rights of children from those of their caregivers" 2010 SAPL 
124-136 
 
Gallinetti 2006 SA Crime Quarterly 
Gallinetti J "What happened to the Child Justice Bill? The process of law 
reform relating to child offenders" 2006 SA Crime Quarterly 7-12 
 
Gallinetti 2010 SAPL 
Gallinetti J "2kul2Btru: What children would say about the jurisprudence of 
Albie Sachs" 2010 SAPL 108-123 
 
Gallinetti "Child Justice" 
Gallinetti J "Child Justice in South Africa: The Realisation of the Rights of 
Children Accused of Crime" in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa (Juta 
Cape Town 2009) 635-664  
 
Gallinetti Getting to Know the Child Justice Act  
Gallinetti J Getting to Know the Child Justice Act (Child Justice Alliance 
Bellville 2009) 
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
465 / 638 
 
Gallinetti, Muntingh and Skelton "Child Justice Concepts"  
Gallinetti J, Muntingh L and Skelton A "Child Justice Concepts" in Sloth-
Nielsen J and Gallinetti J (eds) Child Justice in Africa: A Guide to Good 
Practice (Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape Bellville 
2004)  
 
Goldson and Muncie (eds) Youth Crime  
Goldson B and Muncie J (eds) Youth Crime and Juvenile Justice: Vol 3 – 
Children's Rights and State Responsibilities (Sage Publications London 2009) 
 
Grupp Südafrikas neue Verfassung 
Grupp TM Südafrikas neue Verfassung: Mit vergleichender Betrachtung aus 
deutscher und europäischer Sicht [South Africa's new Constitution: With 
comparative reflection from a German and European perspective] (Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1999)  
 
Guggenheim 2006 Emory Int'l L Rev 
Guggenheim M "Ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, but 
don't expect any miracles" 2006 Emory Int'l L Rev 43-68 
 
Heaton, Church and Church "Marriage" 
Heaton J, Church J and Church J "Marriage" in Joubert WA (ed) The Law of 
South Africa: Vol 16 2nd ed (LexisNexis Durban 2006) 
 
Human "Theory of Children's Rights"  
Human S "The Theory of Children's Rights" in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in 
South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2009) 243-262 
 
Inter-Ministerial Committee Interim Recommendations  
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Young People at Risk Interim Policy 
Recommendations (Minister of Welfare Pretoria 1996) 
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
466 / 638 
 
Jefferson and Head 2007-2008 Hum Rts & Globalization L Rev 
Jefferson H and Head JW "In whose 'best interests'? – An international and 
comparative assessment of US rules on sentencing of juveniles" 2007-2008 
Hum Rts & Globalization L Rev 89-146  
 
Joubert (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook  
Joubert JJ (ed) Criminal Procedure Handbook 10th ed (Juta Cape Town 2011) 
 
Junger-Tas "Trends in International Juvenile Justice"  
Junger-Tas J "Trends in International Juvenile Justice: What Conclusions can 
be Drawn?" in Junger-Tas J and Decker SH (eds) International Handbook of 
Juvenile Justice (Springer Dordrecht 2006) 505-532 
 
Kaime African Charter on the Child 
Kaime T The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A Socio-
legal Perspective (Pretoria University Law Press Pretoria 2009) 
 
Keightley "Children and the Legal System" 
Keightley R "Children and the Legal System: An Overview of Issues Raised 
by Contributors" in Children's Rights (Juta Cape Town 1996) 1-5 
 
Kruger Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure  
Kruger A Hiemstra's Criminal Procedure (LexisNexis Durban 2008; Service 
Issue 4, 2011) 
 
Le Roux-Kemp 2008 Annual Survey of South African Law 
Le Roux-Kemp A "Criminal Procedure" 2008 Annual Survey of South African 
Law 291-338 
 
Long 2009 Int'l J Children's Rts 
Long J "The Impact of the UNCRC on the Italian Legal System" 2009 Int'l J 
Children's Rts 155-170 
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
467 / 638 
 
Maguire 2012 New Crim L Rev 
Maguire J "Children of the Abyss: Permutations of Childhood in South Africa's 
Child Justice Act" 2012 New Crim L Rev 68-121  
 
Mahery "Convention on the Rights of the Child" 
Mahery P "The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Maintaining its Value in International and South African Child Law" in 
Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2009) 309-330 
 
McCarney "Child-friendly Justice"  
McCarney W "The Principles of Child-friendly Justice at National Level" in 
Council of Europe International Justice for Children (Council of Europe 
Strasbourg 2008) 119-127 
 
Müller and Tait 1999 De Jure 
Müller K and Tait M "The best interests of children: a criminal law concept?" 
1999 De Jure 322-329 
 
Ngidi "Upholding the Best Interests"  
Ngidi R "Upholding the Best Interests of the Child in South African Customary 
Law" in Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2009) 
225-242 
 
Palmer "Best Interests Criterion"  
Palmer A "The Best Interests Criterion: An Overview of its Application in 
Custody Decisions Relating to Divorce in the Period 1985-1995" in Keightley 
R (ed) Children's Rights (Juta Cape Town 1996) 98-113 
 
Parker 1994 IJLF 
Parker S "The best interests of the child – Principles and problems" 1994 IJLF 
26-41 
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
468 / 638 
 
Rabie, Strauss and Maré Punishment 
Rabie MA, Strauss SA and Maré MC Punishment: An Introduction to 
Principles 4th ed (Lex Patria Johannesburg 1994)  
 
Rhodes University Oxford South African Concise Dictionary  
Rhodes University: Dictionary Unit for South African English Oxford South 
African Concise Dictionary 2nd ed (Oxford University Press Cape Town 2010) 
 
SA Law Commission Discussion Paper 
South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 79: Project 106: Juvenile 
Justice (SA Law Commission Pretoria 1999) 
 
SA Law Commission Issue Paper 
South African Law Commission Issue Paper 9: Project 106: Juvenile Justice 
(SA Law Commission Pretoria 1997)  
 
SA Law Commission Report 
South African Law Commission Report: Project 106: Juvenile Justice (SA Law 
Commission Pretoria 2000)  
 
Skelton 2011 NJLSP 
Skelton A "From Cook County to Pretoria: A long walk to justice for children" 
2011 NJLSP 413-427 
 
Skelton "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights"  
Skelton A "Constitutional Protection of Children's Rights" in Boezaart T (ed) 
Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2009) 265-290 
 
Skelton "Developing a Juvenile Justice System" 
Skelton A "Developing a Juvenile Justice System for South Africa: 
International Instruments and Restorative Justice" in Keightley R (ed) 
Children's Rights (Juta Cape Town 1996) 180-196 
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
469 / 638 
 
Skelton Restorative Justice and Child Justice  
Skelton A The influence of the Theory and Practice of Restorative Justice in 
South Africa with Special Reference to Child Justice (LLD-thesis UP 2006) 
 
Skelton 2008 CCR 
Skelton A "Severing the umbilical cord: A subtle jurisprudential shift regarding 
children and their primary caregivers" 2008 CCR 351-368 
 
Skelton and Gallinetti 2008 SA Crime Quarterly 
Skelton A and Gallinetti J "A long and winding road. The Child Justice Bill, civil 
society and advocacy" 2008 SA Crime Quarterly 3-9 
 
Sloth-Nielsen 1995 SAJHR 
Sloth-Nielsen J "Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child: Some implications for South Africa" 1995 SAJHR 401-420 
 
Sloth-Nielsen 1996 Int'l J Children's Rts 
Sloth-Nielsen J "The contribution of children's rights to the reconstruction of 
society: Some implications of the constitutionalisation of children's rights in 
South Africa" 1996 Int'l J Children's Rts 323-344 
 
Sloth-Nielsen 1996 SACJ 
Sloth-Nielsen J "Pre-trial detention of children revisited: amending s 29 of the 
Correctional Services Act" 1996 SACJ 60-72 
 
Sloth-Nielsen "Chicken Soup"  
Sloth-Nielsen J "Chicken Soup or Chainsaws: Some Implications of the 
Constitusionalisation of Children's Rights in South Africa" in Keightly R (ed) 
Children's Rights (Juta Cape Town 1996) 6-27 
 
Sloth-Nielsen and Gallinetti 2011 PELJ 
Sloth-Nielsen J and Gallinetti J "'Just say sorry?' Ubuntu, Africanisation and 
the child justice system in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008" 2011 PELJ 63-90 
 
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
470 / 638 
 
Sloth-Nielsen and Mezmur 2008 Int'l J Children's Rts 
Sloth-Nielsen J and Mezmur BD "2 + 2 = 5? Exploring the Domestication of 
the CRC in South African Jurisprudence (2002-2006)" 2008 Int'l J Children's 
Rts 1-28 
 
Snyckers and Le Roux "Criminal Procedure" 
Snyckers F and Le Roux J "Criminal Procedure: Rights of Arrested, Detained 
and Accused Persons" in Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhill J (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2nd ed (Juta Cape Town 2006) ch 51  
 
Snyman Criminal Law 
Snyman CR Criminal Law 5th ed (LexisNexis Durban 2008)  
 
Steyn and Van Tonder Uitleg van Wette  
Steyn LC and Van Tonder SIE Die Uitleg van Wette 5th ed (Juta Cape Town 
1981)  
 
Terblanche 2007 SACJ 
Terblanche SS "Sentencing a child who murders – DPP, KwaZulu-Natal v P 
2006 (1) SACR 243 (SCA)" 2007 SACJ 243-255 
 
Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (1999) 
Terblanche SS The Guide to Sentencing in South Africa (Butterworths Durban 
1999)  
 
Terblanche Guide to Sentencing (2007) 
Terblanche SS A guide to sentencing in South Africa 2nd ed (LexisNexis 
Butterworths Durban 2007)  
 
Terblanche and van Vuren 1997 SACJ 
Terblanche S and van Vuren J "Wat gemaak met kindermisdadigers?" 1997 
SACJ 170-185 
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
471 / 638 
 
Van Bueren International Law 
Van Bueren G The International Law of the Rights of the Child (Martinus 
Nijhoff London 1995) 
 
Van der Vyver 2006 Emory Int'l L Rev 
Van der Vyver JD "Municipal legal obligations of states parties to the 
Convention on the rights of the Child: The South African model" 2006 Emory 
Int'l L Rev 9-41 
 
Viljoen 1999 SALJ 
Viljoen F "Why South Africa should ratify the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child" 1999 SALJ 660-664 
 
Viljoen "African Charter"  
Viljoen F "The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child" in 
Boezaart T (ed) Child Law in South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2009) 331-350 
 
Wakefield and Assim 2011 Afr Hum Rts L J 
Wakefield L and Assim UM "Dawn of a new decade? The 16th and 17th 
sessions of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child" 2011 Afr Hum Rts L J 699-720  
 
Zermatten 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 
Zermatten J "The Best Interests of the Child Principle: Literal Analysis and 
Function" 2010 Int'l J Children's Rts 483-499 
 
Register of legislation  
 
Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 
Correctional Services Act 8 of 1959 
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
472 / 638 
 
Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 
Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 
Small Claims Courts Act 61 of 1984 
 
Register of government publications 
 
NDPP "Directives" 
GN R252 in GG 33067 of 31 March 2010 - National Director of Public 
Prosecutions "Child Justice Act, 2008 (Act no 75 of 2008): Directives in terms 
of section 97(4)"  
 
Register of international documents 
 
African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981) 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990)  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 
United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (1990) 
("Riyadh guidelines") 
United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (1990) 
(JDL or "Havana Rules") 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice 
(1985) ("Beijing Rules") 
 
Register of cases  
 
AD v DW (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae; Department for Social 
Development as Intervening Party) 2008 3 SA 183 (CC) 
A S v Vorster 2009 4 SA 108 (SE) 
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
473 / 638 
 
B v B 2008 4 SA 535 (W) 
Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 2 SA 363 (CC) 
Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) Ltd v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 2 SA 181 (CC) 
Bothma v Els 2010 1 SACR 184 (CC) 
Broome v DPP, Western Cape; Wiggins v Acting Regional Magistrate, Cape Town 
2008 1 SACR 178 (C) 
Central Authority v MV (LS Intervening) 2011 2 SA 428 (GNP) 
Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 2 
SACR 477 (CC) 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) 
De Reuck v DPP, Witwatersrand Local Division 2004 1 SA 406 (CC) 
DPP, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2009 4 SA 222 
(CC) 
DPP, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 1 SACR 243 (SCA) 
Du Toit v Minister for Safety and Security 2009 6 SA 128 (CC) 
F v F 2006 3 SA 42 (SCA) 
Fish Hoek Primary School v GW 2010 2 SA 141 (SCA) 
Fletcher v Fletcher 1948 1 SA 130 (A) 
Gani v S 2011 ZAGPJHC 154 (14 Oct 2011) 
GF v SH 2011 3 SA 25 (GNP) 
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC)  
Geyser v Msunduzi Municipality 2003 5 SA 18 (N) 
Green v Minister of the Interior 1968 4 SA 321 (A) 
J v J 2008 6 SA 30 (C) 
Jackson v Jackson 2002 2 SA 303 (SCA) 
Jaga v Dönges; Bhana v Dönges 1950 4 SA 653 (A) 
Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael's Executor 1917 AD 593 
Le Roux v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and Restorative Justice Centre as 
amici curiae) 2011 3 SA 274 (CC) 
Lubbe v Du Plessis 2001 4 SA 57 (C) 
Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC) 
NDPP v Seevnarayan 2003 2 SA 178 (C) 
P v P 2007 5 SA 94 (SCA) 
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
474 / 638 
 
Picardi Hotels Ltd v Thekwini Properties (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 493 (SCA) 
R v Smith 1922 TPD 199 
S v Acting Regional Magistrate, Boksburg: Venter 2011 2 SACR 274 (CC) 
S v Adams 1971 4 SA 125 (C) 126 
S v B 2006 1 SACR 311 (SCA) 
S v Blaauw 2001 2 SACR 255 (C) 
S v Cloete 2003 2 SACR 489 (O) 
S v Cornick 2007 2 SACR 115 (SCA) 
S v Davidson 1988 3 SA 252 (ZS) 
S v Dayile 2011 1 SACR 245 (ECG) 
S v Heita 1987 1 SA 311 (SWA) 
S v Jansen 1975 1 SA 425 (A) 
S v Kwalase 2000 2 SACR 135 (C) 
S v Khuzwayo Unreported Case Nr 65/2012 (GSJ) (31 May 2012) 
S v Kola 1966 4 SA 322 (A) 
S v Lehnberg 1975 4 SA 553 (A) 
S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) 
S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC) 
S v Mohlobane 1969 1 SA 561 (A) 
S v N 2008 2 SACR 135 (SCA) 
S v Ngoma 1984 3 SA 666 (A) 
S v Nkosi 2002 1 SACR 135 (W) 
S v Pennington 1999 2 SACR 329 (CC) 
S v Solani 1987 4 SA 203 (NC) 
S v Van Rooyen 2002 1 SACR 608 (C) 
S v Williams 1995 2 SACR 251 (CC) 
S v Yibe 1964 3 SA 502 (E) 
Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 1 SA 1171 (CC) 
South African Police Service v Public Servants Association 2007 3 SA 521 (CC) 
V v V 1998 4 SA 169 (C) 
Van Zijl v Hoogenhout 2005 2 SA 93 (SCA) 
 
  
SS TERBLANCHE                                                                    PER / PELJ 2012(15)5 
 
475 / 638 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
Afr Hum Rts L J African Human Rights Law Journal 
CARSA Child Abuse Research in South Africa 
CCR Constitutional Court Review 
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions 
Emory Int'l L Rev Emory International Law Review 
Hum Rts & Globalization L Rev Human Rights & Globalization Law Review 
IJLF International Journal of Law and the Family 
Int'l J Children's Rts International Journal of Children's Rights 
NDPP National Director of Public Prosecutions 
New Crim L Rev New Criminal Law Review 
NJLSP Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy 
PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
SACJ South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
SAJHR South African Journal of Human Rights 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
SAPL South African Public Law 
Stell LR Stellenbosch Law Review 
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg 
 
